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A COMPARISON OF DEFENSE AND WELFARE SPENDING
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1946-1976
James L. Clayton
Professor of History
University of Utah
One of the most important and absorbing questions of our time is whether gov-
ernments should extend or retrench their efforts toward assisting people who do not
seem to be able to make it on their own. Those who believe that governments should
expand their programs to help the needy argue that a compassionate and affluent
society has both the ability and the responsibility to do so; those who believe
that governments have already pushed too far and too fast argue that the advance of
the welfare state must be halted. Closely related to this basic disagreement is
the question whether society must sacrifice in one area in order to build in an-
other, that is whether one government program must come at the expense of another.
Those who argue that governments should do more for their less fortunate people tend
to believe that high levels of defense spending are a hindrance to expanding welfare
programs. Conversely, those who believe defense needs are under funded generally
feel that welfare expenditures are a limitation on national security.
This essay focuses on this warfare-welfare dichotomy by measuring and compar-
ing warfare and welfare expenditures over an extended period of time in two coun-
tries: The United States and the United Kingdom. The main object of this essay is
to show the long-term trends of warfare and welfare spending in these two countries
in order to determine 1) whether either or both are rising or falling, 2) whether
welfare expenditures are inversely related to defense expenditures, and 3) whether
the welfare-warfare experience in a foreign country comparable with the United
States can offer important insights into our present predicaments and help us anti-
cipate certain problems we might face in the future. The United Kingdom was chosen
for comparison with the United States because its defense policies and expenditures
have closely paralleled ours for the past 30 years and because American welfare
expenditures have tended, usually with a lag of about 20 years, to follow those of
Great Britain more than any other country. England is, moreover, our "Mother Coun-
try" in more ways than one, and Americans have readily related to such comparisons
in the past. The base year 1946 was selected because United Kingdom welfare expendi-
tures are available in a complete series only since that date and yet 30 years is a
sufficient time frame to measure both long and short term trends.
I
There are a variety of ways of defining defense expenditures. Most analysts in
America prefer to use the "national defense" expenditures account in the U.S. budget.
This account includes Department of Defense (DoD) outlays, retirement pay for mili- 1
tary personnel, military assistance to friendly nations, and atomic energy outlays.
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This method slightly overstates our defense expenditures since some civilian pro-
grams of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) are included, as are funds for educa-
ting military personnel and their dependents overseas. It understates defense
costs on the other hand by excluding war-related veterans' benefits, interest on
war loans, and that unknown portion of our space program that is primarily military
in nature. Since there is no way fiscally to break out AEC civilian programs, mili-
tary dependent school costs, and war-caused vs. welfare-related veterans' benefits,
efforts to expand on the U.S. budget concept, with one exception, have been largely
unsuccessful and highly controversial. 2 That exception is the method used by the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA) in its reports on world military
expenditures. This agency uses NATO definitions of military spending which gener-
ally exclude civilian-type expenditures of the DoD but include military-related
expenditures of other government agencies, military grants of the donor country,
and military equipment credit purchases. On the average the USACDA defense data
are slightly higher than U.S. budget defense data and are given in calendar rather
than fiscal years. Both of these methods will be used in this essay.
Looking at the period since World War II it seems at first glance that defense
expenditures in the United States have been rising rapidly. Allowing for a reason-
able time period for World War II spending to have worked itself out of the budget-
ary process--say by 1950--it appears that defense spending has risen from $12.4
billion in 1950 to an estimated $101.1 billion for fiscal year 1977. This repre-
sents an increase of 715 percent in 27 years, most of which were years of inter-
national tension and fully half of which America was engaged in combat. Using 1950
as a base year considerably overestimates this recent expansion since it was the
last year before the Korean War, but also underestimates this figure historically
since the level of defense spending in 1950 was approximately four times higher than
traditional defense expenditures during peacetime.4
A better way of measuring spending trends is in constant prices. On this basis
defense spending in constant (1975) dollars rose from $40 billion in 1950 to $84
billion in fiscal 1977, or a little over two rather than seven times. Defense
spending peaked at $133 billion in 1969 and has been falling every year since until
fiscal 1977 when a slight increase occurred. Defense spending has been fairly con-
stant since the Korean War, fluctuating around $100 billion, except for the Vietnam
escalation. Then it went considerably higher, but in recent years defense outlays
have fallen well below the average for the past two decades.
An even more accurate method of measurement is to compare defense expenditures
as a percent of total federal outlays and GNP. In 1950 defense represented 29.1
percent of total federal spending; in 1977 defense had fallen to an estimated 25.6
percent.5 On this basis defense spending has not only been falling since 1968 but
also has declined even from the pre-Korean War base year of 1950. As a percentage
of total public spending (federal, state, and local) defense expenditures have
fallen to their lowest level since 1940.6 Today (1976) defense represents about 15
percent of total government expenditures. In 1968 that figure was 29 percent and in
1953 it was 45 percent. On the other hand defense spending has risen since 1950 as
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a percentage of GNP. In that year defense required 4.6 percent of our total goods
and services; today defense requires 5.8 percent (See Tables 1 and 2).
Perhaps the most accurate and dispassionate way of measuring defense expendi-
tures is to put these data in constant dollars and on a per capita basis. Both
price and population inflation are rendered neutral in this way. In constant dol-
lars America's defense effort is costing less today than at anytime since 1950, and
with the exceptions of last year has fallen every year since the peak year of the
Vietnam War. 7 But on a per capita basis in constant (1958) dollars, defense spend-
ing in 1976 cost $157 for each and every American, the lowest price tag since 1950
when defense cost $11O. During the Great Depression defense costs on this same ba-
sis were far less, about one-seventh what we pay today. Prior to World Wag I de-
fense cost about one-fifteenth the current rate--even in constant dollars.
From the above analysis it should be clear that in real terms the trends of
defense spending in the United States in recent years is sharply downward, not up-
ward, and currently defense outlays are at the lowest level they have been for the
past 25 years. A variety of other data also support this conclusion. 9 This con-
clusion is further born out by the most recent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
study. According to that agency U.S. military expenditures fell from 9.5 percent
of MP in 1967 to 6.2 in 1974, or from $102 billion to S77.9 billion in constant
dollars.10 Since it is frequently assumed that defense spending is rising in the
United States, and particularly at the expense of social welfare programs, it may
be useful at this point to flip back to Chart 1 on page to fix this point visu-
ally in mind.
II
How one defines welfare spending in the United States is also a matter of con-
siderable controversy. There are two generally accepted definitions of long stand-
ing, however, and both will be used here. The first and more important is the So-
cial Security Administration's (SSA) "social welfare" concept which includes feder-
al, state, and local public spending, and also includes welfare-related spending
for all groups, not just for the very poor or those who are stigmatized in one way
or another. I  "Social welfare" reflects expenditures designed to help those Ameri-
cans whose income falls below a certain minimum and seeks to establish minimum stan-
dards of health, education, and housing for everyone. Specifically, this definition
includes expenditures for social insurance, public aid, publicly financed health and
medical programs, veterans' benefits, public housing and education outlays, and a
few other minor activities. A derivative of the social welfare definition is the
"income support" category which only includes social insurance, veterans' benefits,
and public assistance. Income support increased from $17 billion in 1950 to $103
billion in 1974 in constant (1974) dollars, or from 3.7 to 7.9 percent of GNP. 1 2
Social welfare expenditures have risen as a percentage of GNP in almost every
decade of this century. Prior to World War I they represented less than three per-
cent of our CNP: during the 1920's they inched up to four percent; in the Great De-
pression they climbed to more than 10 percent, then fell somewhat during World War
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II only to rise again during the 1950's. Since 1965 social welfare expenditures
have risen exponentially and now stand in excess of 20 percent of GNP.1
3
Social welfare has also steadily increased its share of total public spending
since 1950. In that year social welfare represented 38 percent of all government
outlays; in 1975 that figure had risen to 58 percent. On a per capita basis in
constant dollars social welfare spending had risen about 50-fold since the begin-
ning of this century and about seven-fold since the New Deal. Since 1965 real per
capita social welfare spending has shot up 128 percent, increasing by $47 billion
in fiscal 1975 alone. Despite a spending level in fiscal 1975 of $287 billion
these expenditures continue to grow at an exponential rate (19 percent in 1975) and
show no sign of leveling off.
The second most common definition of welfare is the "income security" category
and its "public assistance" derivative in the U.S. budget. Income security expen-
ditures are designed to help those Americans whose income has been lost or impaired
by retirement, disability, illness, unemployment, poverty, or death. Income secu-
rity outlays have risen from $30 to nearly $140 billion in the past 10 years and
these, too, are growing exponentially. Part of this category includes "public as-
sistance" expenditures for the aged, disabled, blind, and families with dependent
children. This category alone has risen from 4.1 billion in fiscal 1968 to an esti-
mated 23.6 billion in fiscal 1976, an increase of 476 percent in less than a de-
cade.14 Finally, federal outlays for the poor are sometimes viewed as comprising
welfare spending in this country. These outlays include cash benefits, food, hous-
ing, education, health and manpower training. In constant dollars these federal
antipoverty outlays have steadily increased from less than $10 billion to more than
$30 billion since 1960.15
All of these income security programs are limited to federal spending and, con-
sequently, underrepresent welfare spending by the amount states and local govern-
ments spend. This difference is substantial. A better method is to use the "public
welfare" method of the Census Bureau. This definition includes all public spending
for those Americans who are blind, disabled or out of work, females with dependent
children, and the poor who are either old or need medical care or both. These data
are available since 1902 for selected years. 1 6 On a per capita basis and in con-
stant dollars public welfare expenditures rose from less than two dollars in 1902 to
$75 in 1973, or at about the same rate as social welfare expenditures for the same
period. These data, along with social welfare expenditures, are tabulated as a per-
centage of GNP since 1965 in Table 2, and as a percentage of total public spending
in Table 3. Table 4 compares defense and social welfare and public welfare spending
in constant dollars per capita since 1965.
The above tables, and especially Table 4, clearly demonstrate that since 1946
and more particularly in recent years warfare spending in the United States has been
trending downward and welfare spending has been increasing markedly. As a percent-
age of GNP defense spending has fallen generally from its Korean War peak, and has
fallen 57 percent since 1968. An even sharper decline is evident when measured as a
percentage of public spending. On a per capita basis in constant dollars, the drep
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since 1968 is 70 percent. On the other hand, social welfare spending has risen
steadily since 1946 as a percentage of GNP, except for the Korean War years, and
has climbed 46 percent since 1968. The same pattern holds for public welfare spend-
lag. On a per capita basis in constant dollars social welfare climbed 123 percent
between 1965 and 1975, and public welfare 188 percent between 1965 and 1973. Clear-
ly, warfare and welfare spending have been moving in opposite directions during this
generation.
There is no statistically significant correlation between military spending and
either of the two welfare spending categories during the past 25 years, although
there is a demonstrable negative relationship between warfare and welfare spending
during World War 11.17 On the contrary, it seems more likely that a substantial
portion of our welfare revenues since the end of the Korean Conflict have come from
declining defense budgets. Since most of the increases in government spending have
come at the federal level and in the social welfare category, and since tax rates
have not been raised significantly during the past 20 years, it stands to reason
that rising welfare needs have benefitted from declining defense costs. Resistance
to further defense cuts is hardening in the Congress, however, and a continued wel-
fare windfall from further defense cuts seems less likely in the foreseeable future.
The point that declining defense outlays have helped to fund rising welfare programs
has also been arued by Roger Freeman in his insightful study, The Growth of Ameri-
can Government. 1
III
The United Kingdom has traditionally spent a larger share of its resources on
defense than has the United States. This is understandable since England became a
world power two centuries before America did and given England's proximity to poten-
tial enemies and greater suffering as a result of war. During peace-time years in
this century Britain has spent between two and three percent of her GNP on defense,
an amount about twice comparable U.S. expenditures. During World War II Great
Britain expended well over 60 percent of its GNP on that war; the United States less
than 40 percent. World War II loosened the bonds of the British Empire, however,
and recontruction at home and the cost of British occupation troops in Germany
caused a retrenchment in defense commitments. Nevertheless, the U.K. continued to
spend a higher percentage of her GNP on defense than did the U.S. until the outbreak
of the Korean Conflict. From 1952 until the present the U.S. has spent more of her
GNP on defense, with substantially more during the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts.
Today, both nations spend approximately the same percentage of their GNP's for de-
fense. The same pattern holds true for defense spending as a percentage of total
public spending (see Table 3).
Great Britain's steadily declining defense expenditures reflect a gradual ero-
sion in her world position, the dismantling of her empire, basic changes in her de-
fense policy as a result of these two factors, and growing economic limitations.
By avoiding hasty demobilization of her armed forces following World War II she con-
tinued to play a major role in world affairs for a time, but her defense budgets
-405-
were a rising burden on her limited economy now committed to an ambitious program
of socialization. As the Cold War diminished in intensity following the death of
Stalin defense commitments were whittled down. As the years rolled by the primacy
of economics and domestic issues became more and more evident. What began with a
strong emphasis on costly nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the early years of the
Cold War by 1956 had become a matter of relying on the United States' nuclear de-
terrent capabilities and a more limited commitment to NATO. Rising concern over
sluggish growth, rising deficits, and the feared potential limits of the public-
private mix helped cause this shift in emphasis. As with the United States, the
basic problem of the United Kingdom in recent years has been to maintain her de-
clining international influence with diminished defense budgets, rising domestic
problems, and waning public resolve.1
9
In comparing U.S. and U.K. defense expenditures the most significant pattern
seems to be that Britain decided earlier to diminish her role as a world power and
accordingly cut her defense budgets earlier and more deeply than the United States.
Since 1950 the British have halved their defense efforts as measured by total pub-
lic spending; the United States has merely cut out all of the growth subsequent to
1950. On the other hand America's cuts since 1965 have been much deeper than Bri-
tain's, especially on a per capita basis (compare Tables 4 and 5). Still, even
though the sacrifices for defense are roughly equivalent today, because America is
considerably richer her actual defense dollar outlays are more than double those of
the British. The disparity in wealth between the two countries is likely to main-
tain this inequality in outlays for years to come.
IV
The British social welfare programs are not exactly similar with American ef-
forts, but they are sufficiently alike to be roughly comparable. Part of the dif-
ficulty lies in the fact that the English welfare state is much older than the Amer-
ican and has gone further down the road toward "cradle-to-grave" security, a term
coined in the English Beveridge Report of 1942. A further difficulty is that Bri-
tain has much greater breadth of welfare coverage for only a slightly larger invest-
ment of her resources. Complete health insurance, family income allowances, thou-
sands of voluntary organizations that are partly publicly financed, and a relatively
larger influx of immigrants who need state assistance suggest some of the funding
differences in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the British do use the term"so-
cial services" and that term includes programs that are essentially like those in
our "social welfare" sector.2 0 The two systems are therefore fiscally comparable.
To be specific, British "social service" programs include all public (central and
local) spending for: education; the national health services; personal services for
the elderly, handicapped, mentally ill, and child care; school meals; social secur-
ity benefits; veterans' benefits; and public housing subsidies.
In 1929 United Kingdom social services represented 8 percent of GNP compared
with 3.9 percent of GNP for United States social welfare outlays. 21 By 1950 these
figures had risen to 13.7 and 8.9 percent respectively. In 1975 the United Kingdom
spent h21.8 billion or 23.5 percent of her GNP on social services; the United States
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spent $287 billion or 20 percent of her GNP on social welfare.2 2 Today America
spends much more per capita and a larger share of its public funds on education,
veterans' benefits, and social insurance than do the British, but the British ex-
pend more on health services and public housing.23 Although the mix is different
the total social welfare effort in both countries is nearly the same.
The British, like the Americans, also define public welfare more narrowly.
This is their "welfare services" account 2 4 in the national budget. It includes all
public spending (central as well as local) for the aged, handicapped and homeless,
child care, care of mothers and young children, mental health, and domestic health
care. It also includes the cost of providing school meals at reduced prices to dis-
advantaged children and expectant mothers. In 1975 "welfare services" cost the
British El.1 billion or 1.0 percent of their GNP.
Table 2 compares U.S. and U.K. social welfare expenditures as a percent of GNP
for recent decades. Social welfare programs were much more fully developed in Bri-
tain during the Great Depression than in the United States, particularly when one
remembers that the depression was much more severe in America than England. Social
welfare programs have also been growing much more rapidly in the U.S. since the in-
auguration of President Johnson's Great Society in 1965. Since that date U.S. so-
cial welfare expenditures have grown at an annual rate of 8 percent per annum. If
this rate of increase continues, and there is no evidence that it is slackening off,
the United States will surpass the United Kingdom, assuming their rate of increase
remains constant, in social welfare expenditures as a percentage of N before the
end of this decade.
United Kingdom military, social services, and public welfare expenditures in
constant dollars and on a per capita basis are compared in Table 5. As was the case
with comparable U.S. data, U.K. social service expenditures since 1965 have been
rising, although not quite so sharply as in America (see Chart 1). Like defense
outlays, U.S. per capita social welfare expenditures in constant dollars far out-
strip U.K. efforts.
V
A number of fairly firm conclusions can be drawn from comparing defense and
welfare spending in the United States and the United Kingdom during the past 30
years.
First, U.S. and U.K. defense spending data are clearly comparable over time,
but welfare spending data are only roughly comparable. The two most commonly used
welfare spending definitions--social welfare and public welfare--are however approx-
Imately the same for each country. Using these two categories can give fair compar-
isons of welfare commitments between the two nations.
Second, defense spending trends for the U.S. and the U.K. as a percentage of
CNP closely parallel each other over the past three decades. Both show a gradual
Secular decline since the Korean War, but the U.K. started higher and has fallen
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somewhat more. Today, each country sacrifices approximately the same amount of
goods and services to defense.
Third, broadly related social welfare programs as measured by expenditure lev-
els, although much more advanced in the U.K. in earlier decades, will be approxi-,
mately equal by the end of this decade. This is largely because the rate of in-
crease of welfare spending in the U.S. is faster than in the U.K.
Fourth, there is no statistically significant correlation between defense
spending and welfare spending over time in either country. Both defense and welfare
have a life of their own and neither grows primarily at the expense of the other.
The cost of each comes essentially from changing the public-private mix to favor
more government and fewer private undertakings, from increasing taxes, and from en-
larged public deficits. The first of these three is the most important. More than
any other single factor, social welfare spending is responsible for the growth of
the government sector in both the United States and the United Kingdom since 1946.
In England that sector now represents 60 percent of the total economy; in America
almost 40 percent. In each the size of the government sector has occasioned intense
political debate and possibly a diminished growth rate in recent years. Since much
of this growth has been financed through deficits rather than by tax increases, the
size of each country's deficits has mushroomed. In England especially public sec-
tor borrowing requirements measured as a percentage of GNP have almost tripled dur-
ing the past 10 years. In both interest rates have been climbing, but to date the
problems of governmental finance have been much more acute in the United Kingdom,
partly because its debt burden is substantially higher than it is in the United
States.
Fifth, the limits of declining defense budgets seem to have been reached in the
U.S., but not in the U.K. Neither party in the U.S. is talking of continued defense
cuts of the size of recent years and both are now voting for slight increases. In
England the Labor Party is considering further cuts, however, possibly as much as
twenty percent by the early 1980's.25
Sixth, the limits of social welfare and public welfare spending, although in-
tensely discussed on both sides of the Atlantic, have not yet been fixed. The need
to halt the exponential trends of social welfare spending at some point is clearly
recognized, more especially in Great Britain, but the decision to actually flatten
or to reserve this trend has not been made. The Labor Party has decided in their
most recent White Paper to cut both defense and welfare spending by 1980, but most
observers doubt that the Labor Party will in fact cut their welfare budget in real
terms.
Finally, both England and America are presently gambling that their long-term
cuts in defense spending have not dangerously impaired their national security and
that exponentially rising welfare spending will not overburden their economies.
Whether England and America are right on these propositions will be one of the most
important questions that either country will face in the coming years.
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1. See The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1977, p. 22.
2. See the Joint Economic Committee's effort to expand these categories in The
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1974 (Washington, D.C., 1976).
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p. 67.
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terly, Table 3, forthcoming.
7. See 1975 Statistical Abstract, p. 314.
8. See Clayton, Table 4.
9. Other indicators of a falling defense emphasis since 1968 are a massive decline
in military and civilian manpower and substantial percentage declines in em-
ployment in defense products industries, declining defense R&D as a percentage
of total R&D, and declining defense purchases as a percentage of GNP.
10. See footnote 3, p.
11. See 1975 Statistical Abstract, p. 280. For more recent data see the January
1976 issue of the Social Security Bulletin, p. 3.
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Press: Cambridge, 1976), p. 35.
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Census of Governments (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 25 for data to 1967. For
subsequent data see the Census Bureau's annual Governmental Finances in 1973-
74 (Washington, D.C., 1975).
17. This point was made some time ago by Ida Merriam and Alfred Skolnik in their
Social Welfare Expenditures under Public Programs in the United States, 1929-
1966, HEW Research Report No. 25, 1968.
18. See The Growth of American Government (Hoover Institution Press: Stanford,
California, 1975), p. 110.
19. For a survey of British defense policy from World War II to the mid 1960's see
R. N. Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm (New York, 1968). For more current pol-
icy debates The Economist is an excellent source.
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22. Cf. U.K. 1975 Annual Statistical Abstract, p. 54; and U.S. Social Security Bul-
letin, January, 1976, p. 3.
23. For other differences on a comparable basis see Charles Taylor and Michael Hud-
son, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd ed. (New Haven and
London, 1972).
24. See U.K. 1975 Annual Statistical Abstract, p. 57.
25. The Economist, June 5, 1976, p. 18.
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Table 1.
U.S. and U.K. Defense Expenditures as
a Percentage of GNP, 194 6 -1977
U.S.
21.4
6.5
4.8
5.0
4.9
7.2
13.1
14.0
12.9
10.6
9.8
9.9
10.1
9.9
9.3
9.4
9.4
9.1
8.8
7.6
7.9
9.1
9.7
9.0
8.4
7.7
7.2
6.2
5.8
5.8
5.8
S. 5 est.
U.K.
20.1
10.6
7.4
7.0
7.1
8.7
10.7
10.6
9.8
8.9
8.6
8.0
7.4
7.2
7.1
7.1
7.2
7.1
6.6
6.7
6.6
6.7
5.4
5.7
4.8
S.0
5.2
4.9
5.2
5.4
5.4
NA
Sources: R. N. Rosecrance. Defense of the Realm (New York, 1968)
Appendix, Table 1; USACPA, World Ifilitary Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 196S-1974 (liashington, D.C., 1975), p. 50; 1975 U.K.
Annual Abstract of Statistics, p. 326; U.S. Budget in Brief.
Fiscal Year 1977, pp. 67 and 69, for U.S. defense and GNP spending
data for FY 1977.
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Table 2.
U.S. and U.K. Welfare Expenditures as
a Percentage of GNP, 1946-1975
U.S. Social Welfare
Spending as
Year a % of GNP
1946 6.1
7 7.8
8 7.6
9 8.1
1950 8.9
1 7.7
2 7.6
3 7.5
4 8.2
5 8.6
6 8.6
7 9.1
8 10.3
9 10.6
1960 10.6
1 11.5
2 11.6
3 11.6
4 11.7
5 11.8
6 12.2
7 12.9
8 13.8
9 14.1
1970
1
2
3
4
5
15.3
17.0
17.4
17.5
17.7
20.1
U.S. Public Welfare
Spending as
a % of GNP
1.3
NA
.8
NA
1.0
NA
8
.8
.9
.8
.8
.8
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
1.2
1.3
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
NA
U.K. Social Services
Spending (including
housing subsidies)
as % of GNP
NA
NA
NA
NA
13.6
13.1
13.4
13.4
13.1
13.5
13.4
13.5
14.5
14.9
14.9
15.1
15.5
16.2
16.0
17.1
19.7
20.4
21.4
22.1
21.5
21.5
21.5
22.0
22.2
23.5
Sources: Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to
1970 (Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 340 and 1120; Social Security
Bulletin, January, 1976, p. 3; The British Economy, Key Statistics,
1900-1970 (London, 1971), pp. 4 and 12; 1975 U.K. Annual Abstract
of Statistics (London, 1975), p. 54; and Governmental Finances in
1973-74, p. IS.
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Table 3.
U.S. and U.K. Defense and Welfare Lxpenditires as
a Percentape of All Covcrnnent Expenditures, 1946-197S
U.S.
Social Public
Year Defense Welfare Welfare
S3.4 16.1
8
9
1960 27.3
1.3
2.9
2.9
3.0
U. V.
Social
Defense Services
43.6 NA
21.3
27.5
21.6
4
5
6
7
8
9
1970
1
2
3
4
S est.
Sources: Bureau of the Census, IHistorical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970
(Washington, D.C., 1976) pp. 340 and 1120; Social Security Bulletin,
January 1976, p. 10; 197S Statistical Abstract, pp. 250 and 314;
1975 Annual Abstract of Statistics, pp. 54 and 326. The British
Economy, Key Statistics, 1900-1970, p. 12; R. N. Rosccrance,
Defense of the Realm (N.Y., 1968), Appendix, Table 1.
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Table 4.
U.S. Military, Social Welfare, and Public Welfare
Expenditures in Constant (1973) Dollars Per Capita. 1965-1976
Year
1965
6
7
8
9
1970
I
2
3
4
5
6
MILEX
Per
Capita
372
437
498
506
483
434
395
392
374
367
363
352
SWEX
Per
Capita
509
535
614
675
721
779
870
938
1,007
1,028
1,134
NA
PWEX
Per
Capita
26
28
36
40
54
56
60
68
75
NA
NA
NA
Notes: MILEX -
SWEX =
PWEX -
Military Expenditures
Social Welfare Expenditures
Public Welfare Expenditures
1975-76 MILEX figures based on the percentage decline for defense
spending in U.S. Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1977, p. 67.
[Conversion rates are based on consumer price
Statistical Abstract, p. 275.]
index;]and 1974
Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expendi-
tures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 (Washington, D. C., 1976),
p. 50; James Clayton, "The Fiscal Limits of the Warfare-Welfare
State...," Western Political Quarterly, forthcoming, Table 8.
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Table 5.
U.K. Military, Social Services, and Public Welfare
Expenditures in Constant Dollars Per Capita, 1965-1975
Year
1965
6
7
8
9
1970
1
2
3
4
1975
MILEX
Per
Capita
151
148
151
148
138
136
143
154
154
163
141
SSEX
Per
Capita
430
462
423
449
467
475
542
539
578
588
615
PWEX
Per
Capita
7
8
8
10
10
15
19
19
26
38
53
Notes: MILEX
SSEX
PWEX
- Military Expenditures
- Social Services Expenditures
= Public Welfare Expenditures
Sources: U.K. 1975 Annual Abstract of Statistics (London, 1975), pp.
54, 57 and 326; International Financial Statistics, January,
1976, p. 390; and USACDA, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 (Washington, D. C., 1975), p. 50.
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S per capita
1,200
1,100
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
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3 United States and United Kingdom warfare and welfare expenditures
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